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ROBERT E. ROSENWALD, who writes on Exemptions From
Jury Service and Challenges for Cause in Missouri, in this
issue, contributed a related article to the LAW REViEW last
year, on The Right of Judicial Comment on the Evidence in
Missouri. He is a graduate student in the Department of
Political Science of Washington University and a Senior in
the School of Law.
SAMUEL BRECKENRIDGE LAW REVIEW NOTE PRIZES
Announcement of the awarding of the Samuel Breckenridge
prizes for LAW REVIEW notes is made as follows: Sam Elson has
been awarded forty dollars for the best notes in numbers 3 and 4
of Volume XIV and for the best note in that volume. The prizes
were given for Recent Developments in the Right of Privacy,
14 ST. LOUIS L. REv. 306, which was adjudged best for the year
as well as in the issue in which it appeared, and Habitual Crimi-
nal Acts and the Ex Post Facto Clause, 14 ibid. 414. The com-
mittee which made the awards for Volume XIV consisted of
Messrs. Israel Treiman, Robert H. McRoberts, and Milton R.
Stahl. The committee which is judging the notes in Volume XV
is composed of Adolph M. Hoenny, Maurice R. Stewart, and
Monroe Oppenheimer.
Notes
A SURVEY OF APPEALED CASES IN MISSOURI IN 1923-244'
The primary purpose of this study of the final disposition of
cases in the Supreme and Appellate Courts in Missouri is to
reveal the extent to which alleged errors in the admission or ex-
clusion of evidence have been made the basis in whole or in part
of appeals and of reversals. Wigmore' in discussing the effect
to be given to erroneous rulings by a trial court in the admission
or rejection of evidence declares that the issue is whether the
law of evidence "shall be a mere means to an end,-the end be-
ing a just settlement of particular controversies,-or whether it
shall be an end in itself-an end so independent of justice, and
so superior thereto, that it must be attained even at the cost of
* Prepared by Ruth E. Bates, Research Assistant in the School of Law,
1928-1929.
'I Wigmoore, EVIDENCE (2d ed.) sec. 21; Chamberlayne, THE M DERN
LAW OF EVIDENCE, sec. 320, but compare 4 C. J. 963 and 969.
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justice,-this depends practically upon whether it can be con-
ceded an erroneous ruling on evidence is 'ipso facto' a ground
for a new trial."
The original English rule was that an erroneous admission
or rejection of evidence did not justify the court in setting aside
the verdict unless it appeared that the truth had not been
reached. Later the Court of Exchequer declared that an error
in ruling upon an evidence point was per se a ground for a new
trial. This rule was adopted by the other courts of England
and was brought to America. It has since been abolished in
England but it remains the law in the majority of American
states.2
In discussing the Exchequer rule Mr. Wigmore says:
"As to the practical working of the Exchequer rule, the
results are lamentable. Whether in civil or criminal cases,
it has done more than any other one rule of law to increase
the delay and expense of litigation, to encourage defiant
criminality and oppression, and to foster the spirit of
litigious gambling . . . . Just so long as an erroneous rul-
ing on evidence, however trifling, is described by the highest
judges (and in many courts it habitually is) as 'working a
reversal,' just so long will the reproach of technicality and
futility mark our litigation. Until the rules of Evidence
cease to be assimilated to the play of a hand at whist or the
operation of an automatic cash-register, they must remain,
as often as not, the instruments of injustice."
Chamberlayne 3 says the rule gives the criminal an implied
right to outwit the law. "It has proved easy to overlook the
fact that indulgence to the guilty may be, and often is, inhuman
cruelty to the innocent. Setting aside a just verdict on a tech-
nicality is a clemency extended, it will be observed, not to the
person accused of crime-for which there might, indeed, be a
pseudo justification; but to one shown guilty of the crime
charged. Society is placed in the anomalous position of waging
war with its enemies, while imposing a heavy handicap upon it-
self." He says further that the rule "involves a requirement of
absolute inerrancy on the part of a trial judge. He must, at the
peril of justice, comply absolutely with every technical require-
ment of the law of evidence-working out, in the hurry and
other embarrassments of a nisi prius trial, a result to which the
'Judicature Act of 1875; Rules of the Supreme Court (1875) order 39,
rule 6.
'Op. cit. n. 1 above, secs. 312-331.
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greater calm and leisure of an appellate court will not enable
them to find any possible exception. When the number of ad-
ministrative problems, accentuated by the desire of counsel to
'get error into the record,' is considered, the unfairness of this
to a trial judge is obvious. A practically impossible standard is
erected. Penalty, reversal. Result, delay and expense to liti-
gants; disrespect for law."
Chamberlayne also points out that England is not dissatisfied
with the results of its modern rule and quotes Mr. Justice Ami-
don,4 as follows: "For the purpose of comparison, and of seeing
whether this condition [in the United States 5] is a necessary evil,
I have examined the law reports of England for the period ex-
tending from 1890 to 1900, and I find that of all the causes that
were brought under review on appeal in that country, new trials
were granted in less than three and one-half per cent."
A recent investigation of criminal cases before the Supreme
Court of California revealed that "From 1850 to 1899, 215 cases
were reversed because of errors committed in admitting or re-
fusing certain evidence. This number represents 35.5 per cent
of the cases reversed for procedural errors and 29.5 per cent of
the total number of cases reversed." The investigator points out
a decline in reversals in the past 16 years which he attributes to
the constitutional amendment that precludes reversal unless
error is substantial-affecting the case on its merits.0
Missouri has a statutory provision guarding against a reversal
merely because of an erroneous ruling on evidence when the de-
cision on the merits is for the right party.7 The following quo-
tation will indicate the attitude of the Missouri courts toward
the statutory provision: "In view of the fact that we cannot
perceive there was any harm done, we believe that to reverse
the judgment and remand the cause for this irregularity would
be to violate the spirit as well as the letter of section 1513, R. S.
'N. Y. Outlook, July 1906, at p. 601.
According to American statistics as quoted by Mr. Justice Amidon, 46
per cent of all verdicts are reversed and 60 per cent of the new trials
granted are based on alleged error in procedural matters.
'Vernier, Reversal of Criminal Cases in the Supreme Court of California.
2 So. CAL. L. RE V. 21, 27.
'R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 1513: "The Supreme Court or Court of Appeals
shall not reverse the judgment of any court, unless it shall believe that
error was committed by such court against the appellant or plaintiff in
error, and materially affecting the merits of the action." The history of
this law is as follows: originally passed, Laws 1871, p. 49, sec. 33, naming
only the Supreme Court, amended, Laws 1889, sec. 2303, to include the Ap-
pellate Courts.
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1919, forbidding the reversal of a judgment unless the court
shall believe that error 'materially affecting the merits of the
action' was committed. ' '
The statistical report in Table I which follows will show that
during the two-year period considered, only 6.6 per cent of the
668 cases reversed9 were reversed on evidence grounds alone,
and that 11 per cent were reversed on evidence grounds plus
other grounds. This surprisingly low percentage of reversals
on evidential grounds would seem to place Missouri among the
minority group of states in which legislative action giving a
special place to the merits of the case has proved successful.
This attitude of the Missouri court is further emphasized by the
fact that in 86 of the cases affirmed during the two-year period,
non-prejudicial error in the admission or exclusion of evidence
was found.
Table II is not pertinent to the purpose of this investigation
but the material was incidentally available and is appended for
its general informational value. In comparing the amount of
business handled in the Appellate Courts it is fair to note that
the'St. Louis Court of Appeals and the Kansas'City Court of Ap-
peals have, while the Springfield Court of Appeals does not have,
the aid of commissioners.
TABLE I.1 DISPOSITION OF CASES IN THE SUPREME AND AP-
PELLATE COURTS
CIVIL CASES CRIMINAL CASES
Affirmed Reversed Affirmed Reversed
1923 1924 1923 1924 1923 1924 1923 1924
Evidence Grounds ........ 131 136 14 13 31 30 3 14
Evidence and other grounds ....... 35 17 .. .. 16 6
Other grounds ........... 422 334 242 206 59 42 42 59
Totals ................ 553 470 291 236 90 72 61 79
'Slaughter v. Sweet & Piper Horse & Rule Co. (Mo. A. 1924) 259 S. W.
131, 135.
' The cases reversed represent 31.4 per cent of the total number of cases
appealed. During 1924 16.4 per cent of the cases reversed were reversed
solely upon the ground of erroneous instructions and 25.6 per cent of the
reversals were partially upon erroneous instructions. 21.1 per cent of the
cases reversed were criminal cases. Of these 12.1 per cent were reversed
on evidence grounds and 15.6 per cent were reversed on evidence plus other
grounds.
" This table does not take account of original proceedings and cases trans-
ferred. Such cases numbered 62 in 1923 and 152 in 1924, bringing the
total of cases disposed of for the year 1923 to 1115 and for the year 1924
to 1009.
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TABLE II. A COMPARISON OF BUSINESS IN THE SUPREME AND
APPELLATE COURTS OF MISSOURI
Supreme Court
Civil Cases and Writs 1923 1924 Criminal Cases 1923 1924
Affirmed ............ 174 130 Affirmed ............ 50 48
Reversed ............ 86 72 Reversed ............ 40 48
Transferred ......... 6 10 Transferred ......... 13 5
Otherwise disposed of 2 8
Writs ............... 50 76
Disbarment ......... 2
Total ............. 318 298 Total ............. 103 101
St. Louis Court of Appeals
Civil Cases and Writs 1923 1924 Criminal Cases 1923 1924
Affirmed ............ 183 174 Affirmed ............. 8 11
Reversed ............ 88 72 Reversed ............. 6 9
Transferred ......... 3
Otherwise disposed of. 2 1
Writs ............... 5 2
Total ............. 281 249 Total ............. 14 20
Kansas City Court of Appeals
Civil Cases and Writs 1923 1924 Criminal Cases 1923 1924
Affirmed ............ 140 107 Affirmed ............ 16 2
Reversed ............ 76 54 Reversed ............ 3 7
Transferred ......... 4
Otherwise disposed of. 2
Writs ............... 1 8
Total ............. 223 169 Total ............. 19 9
Springfield Court of Appeals
Civil Cases and Writs 1923 1924 Criminal Cases 1923 1924
Affirmed ............. 80 83 Affirmed ............ 15 10
Reversed ............ 40 39 Reversed ............ 12 16
Transferred ......... 6 5 Transferred ......... 1 2
Otherwise disposed of. 1 3 Otherwise dis-
Writs ............... 2 4 posed of ........... 2
Total ............. 129 134 Total ............. 28 24
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